Findes ikke på dansk
Antonio Scalia
- 15 April 2016
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 171Details
- Abstract
- Following the emergence of the financial crisis in August 2007, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision established in 2010 a new global regulatory framework. In addition to raising capital requirements, it introduced three ratios, two of which set out minimum standards for liquidity and funding risk, i.e. the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio, and one which aims to limit leverage in the banking system, i.e. the leverage ratio. All three ratios can have a number of implications for monetary policy implementation, in particular the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio owing to the special role of central banks in providing liquidity. This paper investigates the extent to which the regulatory initiatives might have already had an impact on banks
- JEL Code
- G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 1 September 2011
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1377Details
- Abstract
- The investment of the ECB reserves in US dollars and yen, delegated to a network of portfolio managers in the Eurosystem’s national central banks, involves a periodic assessment of performance against a common benchmark, controlled by the ECB and subject to revision on a monthly basis. Monetary reward for the best performers is almost entirely absent, and compensation comes mainly as reputational credit following the transmission of the annual report to the Governing Council. Employing a new data set on individual portfolio variables during 2002-2009, we study this peculiar tournament and show the existence of risk-shifting behaviour by reserve managers related to their year-to-date ranking: interim losers increase relative risk in the second half of the year, in the same way as mutual fund managers. In the dollar case, risk-shifting is asymmetric: the adjustment to ranking is generally reduced or entirely offset if reserve managers have achieved a positive interim performance against the benchmark. Yen reserve managers that rank low show a tendency to increase effort, as proxied by portfolio turnover. We also find that reserve managers who ranked low in the previous year tend to reduce risk significantly. Our evidence is consistent with a reserve managers’ anecdote, according to which they obtain a concave reputational reward within their national central banks, which induces risk aversion and explains the observed low usage of the risk budget. Since reserve managers should have a comparative advantage over the tactical benchmark within a monthly horizon, possible enhancements to the design of the tournament are discussed. These might involve an increased reward for effort and performance by means of a convex scoring system linked to monthly, rather than annual, performance.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
D81 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty