Pas disponible en français
Kalin Nikolov
Research
- Division
Financial Research
- Current Position
-
Senior Team Lead - Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Financial Economics,Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
- Education
- 2003-2010
PhD in Economics at London School of Economics
- Professional experience
- 2019
Lead and Senior Lead Economist - Financial Research Division, European Central Bank
- 2010-2019
Senior Economist - Financial Research Division, European Central Bank
- 2006-2010
Senior Economist - Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division, Bank of England
- 2002-2003
Economist - Conjunctural Assessment and Projection Division, Bank of England
- 1999-2001
Economist - Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division, Bank of England
- 1998-1999
Economist - Social Market Foundation
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 269Details
- Abstract
- The ECB’s price stability mandate has been defined by the Treaty. But the Treaty has not spelled out what price stability precisely means. To make the mandate operational, the Governing Council has provided a quantitative definition in 1998 and a clarification in 2003. The landscape has changed notably compared to the time the strategy review was originally designed. At the time, the main concern of the Governing Council was to anchor inflation at low levels in face of the inflationary history of the previous decades. Over the last decade economic conditions have changed dramatically: the persistent low-inflation environment has created the concrete risk of de-anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations. Addressing low inflation is different from addressing high inflation. The ability of the ECB (and central banks globally) to provide the necessary accommodation to maintain price stability has been tested by the lower bound on nominal interest rates in the context of the secular decline in the equilibrium real interest rate. Against this backdrop, this report analyses: the ECB’s performance as measured against its formulation of price stability; whether it is possible to identify a preferred level of steady-state inflation on the basis of optimality considerations; advantages and disadvantages of formulating the objective in terms of a focal point or a range, or having both; whether the medium-term orientation of the ECB’s policy can serve as a mechanism to cater for other considerations; how to strengthen, in the presence of the lower bound, the ECB’s leverage on private-sector expectations for inflation and the ECB’s future policy actions so that expectations can act as ‘automatic stabilisers’ and work alongside the central bank.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 27 January 2021
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 80Details
- Abstract
- Episodes such as the current coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis might lead to a significant rise in borrower defaults and, consequently, weakness in the banking sector. Having well-capitalised banks makes the financial system more resilient to such episodes. We assess how much capital would be optimal for banks to hold, taking into consideration the risk of banking crises driven by borrower defaults (which we term “twin default crises”).
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 25 May 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2414Details
- Abstract
- We examine optimal capital requirements in a quantitative general equilibrium model with banks exposed to non-diversifiable borrower default risk. Contrary to standard models of bank default risk, our framework captures the limited upside but significant downside risk of loan portfolio returns (Nagel and Purnanandam, 2020). This helps to reproduce the frequency and severity of twin defaults: simultaneously high firm and bank failures. Hence, the optimal bank capital requirement, which trades off a lower frequency of twin defaults against restricting credit provision, is 5pp higher than under standard default risk models which underestimate the impact of borrower default on bank solvency.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 20 February 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2376Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the interactions of macroprudential and monetary policies. We find, using a range of macroeconomic models used at the European Central Bank, that in the long run, a 1% bank capital requirement increase has a small impact on GDP. In the short run, GDP declines by 0.15-0.35%. Under a stronger monetary policy reaction, the impact falls to 0.05-0.25%. The paper also examines how capital requirements and the conduct of macroprudential policy affect the monetary transmission mechanism. Higher bank leverage increases the economy's vulnerability to shocks but also monetary policy's ability to offset them. Macroprudential policy diminishes the frequency and severity of financial crises thus eliminating the need for extremely low interest rates. Countercyclical capital measures reduce the neutral real interest rate in normal times.
- JEL Code
- E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 24 May 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2286Details
- Abstract
- How far should capital requirements be raised in order to ensure a strong and resilient banking system without imposing undue costs on the real economy? Capital requirement increases make banks safer and are beneficial in the long run but also entail transition costs because their imposition reduces credit supply and aggregate demand on impact. In the baseline scenario of a quantitative macro-banking model, 25% of the long-run welfare gains are lost due to transitional costs. The strength of monetary policy accommodation and the degree of bank riskiness are key determinants of the trade-off between the short-run costs and long-run benefits from changes in capital requirements.
- JEL Code
- E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 13 November 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2195Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies the interaction of government debt and financial markets. This interaction, termed a ‘diabolic loop’, is driven by government choice to bail out banks and the resulting incentives for banks to hold government debt rather than self-insure through equity buffers. We highlight the role of bank equity issuance in determining whether the ‘diabolic loop’ is a Nash Equilibrium of the interaction between banks and the government. When equity is issued, no diabolic loop exists. In equilibrium, banks’ rational expectations of a bailout ensure that no equity is issued and the sovereign-bank loop is operative.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 13 July 2018
- DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES - No. 5Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the costs and bene ts of liquidity regulation. We find that liquidity tools are beneficial but cannot completely remove the need for Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) interventions by the central bank. Full compliance with current Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) rules would have reduced banks' reliance on publicly provided liquidity during the global financial crisis without removing such assistance altogether. The paper also investigates the output costs of introducing the LCR and NSFR using two macrofinancial models. We find these costs to be modest.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 13 July 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2169Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the costs and benefits of liquidity regulation. We find that liquidity tools are beneficial but cannot completely remove the need for Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) interventions by the central bank. Full compliance with current Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) rules would have reduced banks’ reliance on publicly provided liquidity during the global financial crisis without removing such assistance altogether. The paper also investigates the output costs of introducing the LCR and NSFR using two macro-financial models. We find these costs to be modest.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation - Network
- Discussion papers
- 9 July 2015
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1827Details
- Abstract
- We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model for the positive and normative analysis of macroprudential policies. Optimizing financial intermediaries allocate their scarce net worth together with funds raised from saving households across two lending activities, mortgage and corporate lending. For all borrowers (households, firms, and banks) external financing takes the form of debt which is subject to default risk. This
- JEL Code
- E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 15 August 2014
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1716Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the robustness of the Kiyotaki-Moore collateral amplification mechanism to the existence of complete markets for aggregate risk. We show that, when borrowers can hedge against aggregate shocks at fair prices, the volatility of endogenous variables becomes identical to the first best in the absence of credit constraints. The collateral amplification mechanism disappears. To motivate the limited use of contingent contracts, we introduce costs of issuing contingent debt and calibrate them to match the liquidity and safety premia the data. We .find that realistic costs of state contingent market participation can rationalize the predominant use of uncontingent debt. Amplification is restored in such an environment.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
D52 : Microeconomics→General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium→Incomplete Markets
- 17 November 2012
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1495Details
- Abstract
- We build a model of rational bubbles in a limited commitment economy and show that the impact of the bubble on the real economy crucially depends on who holds the bubble. When banks are the bubble-holders, this ampli?es the output boom while the bubble survives but also deepens the recession when the bubble bursts. In contrast, the real impact of bubbles held by ordinary savers is more muted.
- JEL Code
- E : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
- Network
- Macroprudential Research Network
- 16 November 2012
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 232Details
- Abstract
- We build a model of rational bubbles in a limited commitment economy and show that the impact of the bubble on the real economy crucially depends on who holds the bubble. When banks are the bubble-holders, this amplifies the output boom while the bubble survives but also deepens the recession when the bubble bursts. In contrast, the real impact of bubbles held by ordinary savers is more muted.
- JEL Code
- E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- 5 November 2012
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1490Details
- Abstract
- In this paper, we build a Kiyotaki-Moore style collateral amplification framework which generates large endogenous fluctuations in the leverage available to investing firms. We assume that defaulting borrowers lose not only their tangible collateral but also their future debt market access. The possibility of such market exclusion can lead to the emergence of intangible collateral in equilibrium alongside the tangible collateral which is usually studied in the literature. Fluctuations in the value of intangible collateral are isomorphic to fluctuations in the downpayments they need to make in their purchases of productive assets. This modification of the Kiyotaki-Moore model substantially increases its amplification of exogenous shocks.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- Network
- Macroprudential Research Network
- 1 January 2002
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 113Details
- Abstract
- This paper provides a brief survey of the role of financial frictions in the monetary transmission mechanism. After noting some of the key stylised facts that any model of the transmission mechanisms must be consistent with, we discuss both the classical interest rate channel and the credit and bank lending channels of monetary transmission. We then review the empirical evidence relating to the relative importance of these channels. Finally we consider what impact the presence of significant financial frictions might have on the conduct of monetary policy
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy - Network
- Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network
- 2023
- International Journal of Central BankingAssessing the Impact of Basel III : Review of Transmission Channels and Insights from Policy Models
- 2023
- Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (forthcoming)Housing, Distribution and Welfare
- 2021
- International Journal of Central BankingThe impact of capital requirements on the macroeconomy: lessons from four macroeconomic models of the Euro Area
- 2020
- Journal of Monetary EconomicsBank Capital in the Short and in the Long Run
- 2018
- Journal of Money, Credit and BankingDynamic Capital Requirements
- 2018
- International Economic ReviewGovernment Debt and Banking Fragility: the Spreading of Strategic Uncertainty
- 2017
- Proceedings of the 2016 joint ECB-Chicago Fed Banking ConferenceCapital Regulation: Lessons from a Macroeconomic Model
- 2015
- International Journal of Central BankingCapital Regulation in a Model with Three Layers of Default’
- 2015
- Journal of Monetary EconomicsBubbles, Banks and Financial Stability
- 2014
- Journal of Economic Dynamics and ControlCollateral Amplification under Complete Markets
- 2014
- Journal of Mathematical EconomicsSafe Asset Shortages and Asset Price Bubbles
- 2014
- Financial Stability Review, Banque de FranceMacroprudential capital tools: assessing their rationale and effectiveness
- 2014
- Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles, Banco de PortugalThe 3D Model: a Framework to Assess Capital Regulation
- 2011
- Journal of Economic Dynamics and ControlA Bayesian Approach to Optimal Monetary Policy with Parameter and Model Uncertainty
- 2011
- Journal of Money, Credit and BankingWinners and Losers in Housing Markets
- 2009
- Bank of England Quarterly BulletinQuantitative Easing
- 2006
- NBER International Seminar in Macroeconomics 2004Rule based monetary policy under central bank learning
- 2004
- Journal of Money, Credit and BankingMonetary policy and stagflation in the UK
- 2004
- Bank of EnglandThe Bank of England Quarterly Model
- 2003
- Journal of Economics and BusinessUK inflation in the 1970s and 1980s: the role of output gap mismeasurement
- 2003
- Monetary Transmission in the Euro Area