Nije dostupno na hrvatskom jeziku.
Paul Bochmann
- 20 November 2023
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2023Details
- Abstract
- Euro area bank earnings have reached multi-year highs, while bank equity valuations have not substantially exceeded pre-pandemic levels. Banks’ exposure to corporate credit risk and the perception of their stocks as value stocks have contributed to the stagnant valuations. However, valuations cannot be fully explained by fundamentals and may be due to heightened uncertainty about shareholder access to returns earned by banks. Overall, this increases the cost of lending to the real economy and makes it harder for banks to raise capital.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
- 9 November 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2870Details
- Abstract
- We empirically analyze the interaction of monetary policy with financial stability and the real economy in the euro area. For this, we apply a quantile vector autoregressive model and two alternative estimation approaches: simulation and local projections. Our specifications include monetary policy surprises, real GDP, inflation, financial vulnerabilities and systemic financial stress. We disentangle conventional and unconventional monetary policy by separating interest rate surprises into two factors that move the yield curve either at the short end or at the long end. Our results show that a build-up of financial vulnerabilities tends to be accompanied initially by subdued financial stress which resurges, however, over a medium-term horizon, harming economic growth. Tighter conventional monetary policy reduces inflationary pressures but increases the risk of financial stress. [...]
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
- 20 February 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2787Details
- Abstract
- This paper evaluates the impact of the March 2020 European Central Bank recommenda-tion that banks do not pay dividends or buy back shares on their market values. It documents a causal negative impact on bank share prices of around 7% during the two weeks following its announcement. The recommendation affected the market values of banks directly, by delaying investor cash flows and indirectly, by increasing the uncertainty about future distri-butions and thus banks’ equity risk premia. The impact differed across banks depending on their distribution plans and risk-adjusted profitability. Our analysis highlights the impor-tance of managing perceptions about dividend uncertainty through credible communication about the expected duration, frequency and severity of dividend restrictions to limit their unintended side effects.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
- 5 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2698Details
- Abstract
- We propose the CoJPoD, a novel framework explicitly linking the cross-sectional and cyclical dimensions of systemic risk. In this framework, banking sector distress in the form of the joint probability of default of financial intermediaries (reflecting contagion from both direct and indirect interconnectedness) is conditioned on the financial cycle (reflecting the buildup and unwinding of system-wide balance sheet leverage). An empirical application to large systemic banks in the euro area, US and UK illustrates how the unravelling of excess leverage can magnify banking sector distress. Capturing this dependence of banking sector distress on prevailing financial imbalances can enhance risk surveillance and stress testing alike. An empirical signaling exercise confirms that the CoJPoD outperforms the individual capacity of either its unconditional counterpart or the financial cycle in signaling financial crises – particularly around their onset – suggesting scope to increase the precision with which macroprudential policies are calibrated.
- JEL Code
- C19 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Other
C54 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Quantitative Policy Modeling
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 28 June 2021
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 13Details
- Abstract
- This article evaluates the impact on euro area bank valuations of the March 2020 European Central Bank (ECB) recommendation not to pay dividends or buy back shares. The analysis provides evidence of a negative impact on bank valuations in the order of magnitude of 7%. That impact is not, however, homogenous across banks: institutions that pay out dividends but fail to generate returns commensurate with investor requirements are found to be more strongly affected than those generating shareholder value or banks that are too weak to pay out dividends even in the absence of dividend restrictions. Further, the analysis suggests that uncertainty over future distributions arising from the SSM recommendation, rather than the suspension of dividends per se, explains most of the negative impact on bank valuations. By construction, this analysis captures the side effects of the measure, notwithstanding its overall merit in preserving bank capital and sustaining bank intermediation capacity during the COVID-19 period.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
C31 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Cross-Sectional Models, Spatial Models, Treatment Effect Models, Quantile Regressions, Social Interaction Models
- 22 January 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 254Details
- Abstract
- The cost of equity for banks equates to the compensation that market participants demand for investing in and holding banks’ equity, and has important implications for the transmission of monetary policy and for financial stability. Notwithstanding its importance, the cost of equity is unobservable and therefore needs to be estimated. This occasional paper provides estimates of the cost of equity for listed and unlisted euro area banks using a three-step methodology. In the first step, ten different models are estimated. In the second step, the models’ results are combined applying an equal-weighting procedure. In the third step, the combined costs of equity for individual banks are aggregated at the euro area level and according to banks’ business models. The results suggest that, since the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-08, the premia that investors demand to compensate them for the risk they bear when financing banks’ equity has been persistently higher than the return on equity (ROE) generated by banks. We show that our estimates of cost of equity have plausible relationships to banks’ fundamentals. The cost of equity tends to be higher for banks that are riskier (higher non-performing loan ratios), less efficient (higher cost-to-income ratio), and with more unstable funding sources (higher relative reliance on interbank deposits). Finally, we use bank fundamentals to estimate the cost of equity for unlisted banks. In general, unlisted banks are found to have a somewhat lower cost of equity compared to listed banks, with business model characteristics accounting for part of the estimated difference.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G1 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets
- 19 October 2020
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 11Details
- Abstract
- This article discusses how market pressure can impede the usability of regulatory buffers. The capital relief measures in the euro area since the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis had so far mixed effects on banks’ target CET1 ratio, suggesting an impeded pass-through. Market pressure can be a key explanatory factor, with pressure from credit and, critically, equity investors.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
- 20 November 2019
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2019Details
- Abstract
- This special feature discusses several ways in which the measurement of banks’ systemic footprint can be complemented with new indicators. The international approach is largely mechanical, but is intended to be complemented by expert judgement. The proposed additional systemic footprint measures may help macroprudential authorities in exercising that judgement. Using loan-level data matched with individual corporate balance sheet information allows macroprudential authorities to gain a better understanding of how a bank’s failure may affect employment and economic activity. Similar data, used in a model of network contagion, help assess the impact of a bank’s failure on the rest of the system. While the measures proposed in this special feature are not embedded in O-SII or G-SII scores, some evidence suggests that the concepts discussed have informed decisions of macroprudential authorities.
- 22 December 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2120Details
- Abstract
- How do capital and liquidity buffers affect the evolution of bank loans in periods of financial and economic distress? To answer this question we study the responses of 219 individual banks to aggregate demand, standard and unconventional monetary policy shocks in the euro area between 2007 and 2015. Banks’ responses are derived from a factor-augmented VAR, which relates macroeconomic aggregates to individual bank balance sheet items and interest rates. We find that banks with high capital and liquidity buffers show a more muted response in their lending to adverse real economy shocks. Capital and liquidity buffers also affect bank responses to monetary policy shocks. High bank capitalisation reduces the degree to which banks increase the average duration of loans to the non-financial corporate sector, while high bank liquidity strengthens the positive response to policy easing of both longand short-term loans to the non-financial corporate sector. The latter findings substantiate the relevance of interactions between prudential controls and monetary policy.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages