Rodolfo Dall’Orto Mas
International & European Relations
- Current Position
-
Senior Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,International Economics,Public Economics
- Other current responsibilities
- 2017
Senior Board Operations Officer, International Monetary Fund
- Education
- 2004-2005
MA in Fiscal Advisory and Taxation, CEF Centro de Estudios Financieros, Spain
- 2003
Specialist in Stock-Exchange Analysis and Portfolio Management, IEB Instituto de Estudios Bursátiles, Spain
- 1997-2001
BA in Economics, Universidad del Pacífico, Peru
- Professional experience
- 2017
Senior Board Operations Officer - Operations Division, Secretary's Department, International Monetary Fund, United States of America
- 2015-2017
Desk economist for Brunei Darussalam, Asia and Pacific Department, International Monetary Fund, United States of America
- 2009-2017
Board Operations Officer - Operations Division, Secretary's Department, International Monetary Fund, United States of America
- 2012-2014
Desk economist for the Republic of Palau, Asia and Pacific Department, International Monetary Fund, United States of America
- 2005-2009
Head of Economic Research, Research Department, FocusEconomics, Spain
- 2002-2003
Chief of Economic Research, Asociación de Exportadores ADEX, Peru
- Awards
- 2017
Capacity Development Technology Challenge (Third Place), International Monetary Fund
- 2013
Fundwide Award in Operational Excellence, International Monetary Fund
- 6 October 2020
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 248Details
- Abstract
- This Occasional Paper analyses how significant expansions in central banks’ mandates, roles and instruments can result in challenges to the independence of monetary policy. The paper reviews, in particular, some of the key challenges to central bank independence brought about by the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 and assesses their impact on the de jure and de facto independence of selected central banks around the world in the past few years. It finds that although the level of de jure (legal) central bank independence did not deteriorate, the level of de facto (actual) independence of the central banks of some of the largest economies in the world may have weakened. The paper presents counterarguments to the key critiques raised against central banks due to their policy response during the GFC, and concludes that the case for central bank independence is as strong as ever.
- JEL Code
- B1 : History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches→History of Economic Thought through 1925
B2 : History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches→History of Economic Thought since 1925
C4 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics
E3 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
E6 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
K3 : Law and Economics→Other Substantive Areas of Law
N1 : Economic History→Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics, Industrial Structure, Growth, Fluctuations
N2 : Economic History→Financial Markets and Institutions
- 2014
- Country Report No. 14/111Achieving long-term fiscal sustainability in Palau
- 2009
- Revista Punto de Equilibrio No. 101
- 2000
- Revista Punto de Equilibrio No. 69Hacia una nueva arquitectura financiera: no 1, 2, 3 Vietnam pero sí 1, 2, o más uniones monetarias