Nije dostupno na hrvatskom jeziku.
Adrien Amzallag
- 18 February 2019
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2243Details
- Abstract
- Do negative policy rates hinder banks’ transmission of monetary policy? To answer this question, we examine the behaviour of Italian mortgage lenders using a novel loan-level dataset. When policy rates turn negative, banks with higher ratios of retail overnight deposits to total assets charge more on new fixed rate mortgages. This suggests that the funding structure of banks may matter for the transmission of negative policy rates, especially for long-maturity illiquid assets. Nevertheless, the aggregate economic implications for households are small, suggesting that concerns about inefficient monetary policy transmission to households under modestly negative rates are likely overstated.
- JEL Code
- E40 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→General
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 8 November 2017
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 199Details
- Abstract
- Asset-backed securities (ABSs) and covered bonds (CBs) are structured finance instruments that require a range of key services, which may be provided by many firms. However, despite the prevalence of structured finance instruments in Europe, the network between issuers and service providers has to date remained unexplored. This paper traces and describes these connections, using a new database covering the majority of public ABSs and CBs outstanding between August 2008 and March 2017. It appears that ABS and CB issuers are highly reliant on affiliated counterparties (“close links”) to provide the above-mentioned key services, especially when programmes are larger and/or are retained by the issuer for use as collateral with the Eurosystem. When only “non-close links” across banking groups are considered, instances of reliance on just a few service providers have gradually decreased in number, with a more balanced system developing over time. The paper finds similar results for networks based on the use of securities as Eurosystem collateral. These findings help demonstrate the importance of the Eurosystem’s risk management framework for ABSs and CBs, and support the orientation of recent regulatory efforts at the European level.
- JEL Code
- G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 28 July 2014
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 154Details
- Abstract
- This study examines the European Commission
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
C13 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Estimation: General
C23 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
- 11 October 2013
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 152Details
- Abstract
- The use of macro stress tests to assess bank solvency has developed rapidly over the past few years. This development was reinforced by the financial crisis, which resulted in substantial losses for banks and created general uncertainty about the banking sector's loss-bearing capacity. Macro stress testing has proved a useful instrument to help identify potential vulnerabilities within the banking sector and to gauge its resilience to adverse developments. To support its contribution to safeguarding financial stability and its financial sector-related work in the context of EU/IMF Financial Assistance Programmes, and looking ahead to the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the ECB has developed a top-down macro stress testing framework that is used regularly for forward-looking bank solvency assessments. This paper comprehensively presents the main features of this framework and illustrates how it can be employed for various policy analysis purposes.
- JEL Code
- C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E47 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation